Access control to ensure secure interoperation in multidomain environments is a crucial challenge. A multidomain environment can be categorized as tightly-coupled or loosely-coupled. The specific access control challenges in loosely-coupled environments have not been studied adequately in the literature.
INTRODUCTION
Access control poses a significant challenge to ensure that data is exchanged and shared in a secure way in a multidomain environment. We refer to this as the secure interoperation problem (Gong, 1996) . In a typical scenario, a multidomain environment may involve a small number of organizations closely related to each other. They typically collaborate for a common purpose and interoperations among them need to be predefined to complete the common task. We refer to such multidomain environments as tightly-coupled environments. With the recent advances in distributed systems and networking technologies, such small and tightly-coupled environments can not satisfy the fast growing interoperation needs. Dynamic interoperations among very large number of distributed domains become not only feasible but also increasingly popular. We refer to such an environment as the loosely-coupled environment.
In the literature, the access control challenges in tightly-coupled environments have been studied extensively and they in general use global policy based approaches (Gong, 1996; Shafiq, 2005) . The specific access control challenges in a looselycoupled environment, however, have not been studied adequately in the literature. In this paper, we focus on analyzing and identifying the access control challenges in loosely-coupled environments. Based on our analysis, we propose a decentralized secure interoperation framework for loosely-coupled environments. We believe this is the first step towards solving all those challenges we identify. Assuming that each individual domain employs RBAC and the hybrid hierarchy, the proposed framework consists of three components: Domain Discovery, Trust Management, and Policy Integration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss the background of our work in Section 2. We analyze access control challenges in loosely-coupled environments in Section 3. The proposed secure interoperation framework is described in Section 4. We conclude our work in Section 5.
BACKGROUND

RBAC and Hybrid Hierarchy
In RBAC (Ferraiolo, 2001) , users and permissions are associated through roles. Any user assigned to a role can acquire the permissions assigned to that role. One of the most distinguished features of RBAC is the role hierarchy, defining inheritance semantics over roles. Joshi et al. have proposed hybrid hierarchy containing the following three relations (Joshi, 2002) : permission-inheritance-only (I-relation, ≥ i ), activation-inheritance-only (A- Semantically, x ≥ i y means that permissions available through y are also available through x; x ≥ a y means that any user who can activate x can also activate y; and x ≥ y means that permissions available through j are available through s and users who can activate s can also activate j. Figure 1 shows the legend of our paper. In hybrid hierarchy, if an I-relation precedes an A-relation in the hierarchy, then there is no permission acquisition relation between the two end roles. Consider s ≥ i r ≥ a j. Here, the user assigned to s can neither activate j nor inherit the permissions of j through the I-relation between s and r. 
Secure Interoperation
Gong et al. (Gong, 1996) has proposed two principles to the secure interoperation problem:
• Principle of Autonomy: If an access is permitted within an individual system, it must also be permitted under secure interoperation.
• Principle of Security: If an access is not permitted within an individual system, it must not be permitted under secure interoperation.
Typically, the principle of autonomy is ensured by not changing the individual policy; and the principle of security is ensured by detecting and removing the access cycles. As shown in Figure 2 , assume some interoperation requires r 2 of domain d 1 to be made senior of r 3 of d 2 , and another interoperation requires r 4 to be made senior of r 1 . There is an access cycle (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 , r 1 ) and the principle of security has been violated since the users of r 2 are now authorized to acquire permissions of r 1 in d 1 . In the literature, many global policy based approaches have been proposed (Gong, 1996; Shafiq, 2005) to address the secure interoperation problem in tightlycoupled environment. A global policy is predefined by central administrators by integrating all individual access control policies. And the access cycles are detected and removed in the global policy. In a loosely-coupled environment, global policy cannot be used since the interoperation needs are dynamic. Several trust management approaches (Blaze, 1996; Li, 2002) have been proposed to make dynamic authorization decisions based on trust policies. However, trust management can only solve a part of the access control challenges in looselycoupled environment, as shown in Section 3. 
LOOSELY-COUPLED ENVIRONMENTS
Characteristic
The domains in a loosely-coupled environment are typically independent to each other and are able to carry out their major functions themselves. The interoperation needs are raised dynamically to share the data whenever needed. Therefore, the interoperation needs in loosely-coupled environments are dynamic and cannot be predefined. For example, consider a distributed health care system (e.g. HL7) that consists of different hospitals, clinic, health care station, and other related organizations. Assume Bob travels outside his hometown and needs to go to an emergency unit. The local hospital (Hospital A) might need to access his health information from his home hospital (Hospital B) to provide him with a proper treatment. This particular interoperation need is driven by a specific event (Bob needs to go to the emergency), and we cannot predefine that Hospital A should always be authorized to access Bob's health information from Hospital B.
Specific Access Control Challenges
The first challenge is how to locate the domains that contain the requested permissions in the access The second challenge is how to make an access control decision for a particular interoperation request. Global policy based approach cannot be applied here since the interoperation needs cannot be predefined. For example, at the time when both Hospital A and Hospital B join the network, the administrators cannot pre-define that Hospital A can access Bob's health information from Hospital B. This is because such interoperation need is only necessary when Bob needs to go to the emergency ward in Hospital A and this may never happen. In the literature, trust management systems are typically used to make authorizations among unknown domains. In a trust management system, each domain specifies its local trust policy (typically consists of credentials that is required to access some resources), and employs some credential validation and trust negotiation approaches to make the authorization decisions. For example, when the healthcare workers in Hospital A request Bob's health information from Hospital B, Hospital B may require that only the users with valid healthcare licenses be allowed access to Bob's health information, and ask healthcare workers in Hospital A to present their license in order to gain the access. Once the license has been verified, the access request is granted and the healthcare workers in Hospital A can now access Bob's health information from Hospital B. This challenge shows that a Trust Management component is necessary in looselycoupled environments.
The third challenge is how to prevent the access cycle and preserve the principle of security during the interoperation. The access cycles could be formed when multiple authorized interoperations coexist within the same time period. Consider the example shown in Figure 3 . Assume Bob is registered and taken cared of at his home hospital (Hospital B), where both the doctor and resident are authorized to access his healthcare information. Of course, doctors have more privileges, such as adding a new entry to his record, so Doctor role is made senior to Resident role in Hospital B's local policy. In Hospital A located at another city, healthcare workers are responsible for maintaining normal health care information. There are specialist doctors that are all experts of cancer and they may need special privileges to maintain cancer-related information. Therefore, SpecialistDoctor is made senior to HealthCare-Worker in Hospital A. Now assume that Bob needs to go to the emergency ward in Hospital A when he travels to that city. To take care of Bob, the healthcare worker in Hospital A needs to access Bob's health care records and also needs to add a new entry to Bob's records. So HealthCareWorker of Hospital A is made senior to Doctor of Hospital B to facilitate such interoperation needs (Interoperation 1 in Figure 3 ). Assume at the same time, hospital B receives a cancer patient but is unable to make a proper treatment plan since they are not experts of cancer. The doctor in hospital B asks the resident to get some help from the specialist doctors in Hospital A (e.g. accessing some cancer-specific information in Hospital A to learn how to make the proper treatment). As a result, Resident of Hospital B is made senior to SpecialistDoctor of Hospital A to facilitate such interoperation needs (Interoperation 2 in Figure 3 ). At this time instant when both interoperations 1 and 2 in Figure 3 environments. Therefore, the existing access cycle detection and removal approaches employed in global policy based approaches in the literature cannot be applied here. This challenge shows that proper mechanisms to ensure principle of security are necessary in loosely-coupled environments. Figure 4 shows the architecture of our decentralized secure interoperation framework. The left part shows the components involved when the domain is providing resources to other domains' access requests, while the right part shows the components when the domain is requesting resources from other domains. An interoperation access request (iar) is the access request such that the requesting domain is different from the domain containing the requested permissions, as defined formally below: 
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
Definition 1 (Interoperation Access Request
Domain Discovery and Role Mapping
Given an iar, we need to decide which domains contain the requested permissions. First, the domains receiving the requested permissions need to decide a set of roles that contain a subset of the requested permissions, and we refer to this as the Role Mapping problem. Second, given the roles written by the Role Mapping components of other domains, the requesting domain needs to identify a set of involved domains that together can provide exactly the requested permissions. In (Zhang, 2010) , we have proposed a rolemapping algorithm that can be used for the Role Mapping component, and propose several domain discovery protocols that can be used to identify the involved domains. Based on the output of the Role Mapping algorithm, we define the answer of iar as below: Definition 2 (Answer of iar). 
Trust Management
The Trust Management component is responsible for deciding whether an sar should be authorized or not.
There are a lot of trust management approaches proposed in the literature. Since our framework is role-based, any role based trust management work could be used here. For example, RT (Li, 2002 ) (a role-based trust management language) can be used in our framework to specify the relevant policies on whether an sar should be authorized. 
Policy Integration
Policy Integration component is responsible for preventing access cycles and preserving principle of security when facilitating an authorized sar. As discussed before, the existing access cycle removal approaches employed in global policy based approaches cannot applied here. We propose a novel policy integration approach that uses the special semantics of hybrid hierarchy to prevent the access cycles. For each authorized sar, we create an access role for the requesting domain to access the resources of the involved domain through hybrid hierarchy, as defined below: Definition 4 (Access Role). Given an authorized sar = <d 1 , r 1 , d 2 , R 2 >, the access role of this sar, denoted as ar (d 1 , r 1 ) , is a newly created role in d 2 such that ∀r∈R 2 , we make r 1 ≥ a ar (d 1 , r 1 ) ≥ i r. Figure 5a shows an example of the access role. We can easily verify that the users of r 1 can acquire the permissions of R 2 by activating ar (d 1 , r 1 ) , so the interoperation has been facilitated. Consider the two sars shown in Figure 5b . Although there is a cycle (r 1 , r 2 , ar(d 1 , r 2 ), r 3 , r 4 , ar(d 2 , r 4 ), r 1 ), there is no violation of principle of security. This is beacuse in d 1 the users of r 2 cannot acquire the permissions of r 1 since there is an I-relation preceding an A-relation in the path. This shows that as long as we use the proposed policy integration approach by linking the access role through hybrid hierarchy, the principle of security will be implicitly preserved regardless of the specific interoperation needs. We finally define the interoperation policy and its checking rule: 
Definition 5 (Interoperation Policy). Assume R and AR represent the set of all roles and all access roles in a domain d, the interoperation policy IP of d, is a relation between AR and R: IP=AR×R
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we analyze the specific access control challenges in loosely-coupled environments, and propose a secure interoperation framework to address these challenges. The proposed framework consists of three components: Domain Discovery, Trust Management, and Policy Integration.
